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The Second Battle of Sirte was a naval engagement in which the escorting warships of a British convoy to Malta frustrated a much more powerful ''Regia Marina'' (Italian Navy) squadron. The British convoy was composed of four merchant ships escorted by four light cruisers, one anti-aircraft cruiser, and 17 destroyers. The Italian force comprised a battleship, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers.〔O'Hara, 2009 p. 163〕 Despite the initial British success at warding off the Italian squadron, the battle delayed the convoy's planned arrival before dawn, which exposed it to intense air attacks that sank all four merchant ships and one of the escorting destroyers in the following days.〔O'Hara, 2009 p. 169-70〕 The battle occurred on 22 March 1942, in the Mediterranean, north of the Gulf of Sidra and southeast of Malta, during the Second World War. ==Background== Malta had long been a major factor in British successes against Italian convoys to North Africa,〔"For most authors who have dealt with the Mediterranean theater, Malta was key to the war there." Sadkovich, page 68〕〔Austin, Douglas: ''Malta and British strategic policy, 1925–43.'' Volume 13 of Cass series—military history and policy. Routledge, 2004, page 186. ISBN 978-0-7146-5545-1〕 and in return became the target of an increasing number of heavy Axis air raids. By early 1942, however, the Allies lost the initiative in the central Mediterranean as Italian and German forces gained the upper hand in their attempts to isolate Malta and even made plans to remove it as a threat.〔"In April and during the first half of May while Malta was writhing under the effects of the air offensive and the naval blockade, the Italian supply operations for Africa were characterized by an intensity of activity and an ease of operation such as was not experienced at any other time during the war. Malta, that painful thorn in the Italians' side, had been practically eliminated as a threat to the Italian supply routes, and it was possible to send out several convoys, escorted by only one or two destroyers, without meeting the least opposition. The convoys could now be safely routed scarcely 50 miles from Malta, thereby enjoying the advantage of a much shortened trip, without provoking the island to unleash even one of its terrible weapons." Bragadin, page 155〕〔"The dramatic experience of the last months of 1941 and the gravity of the situation which Malta had imposed on the Axis were such close and tangible matters to everyone that finally Italian and German leaders who were responsible for the conduct of the war, were convinced that the problem must be met with radical measures. It had now become evident that to win the Mediterranean war, it was necessary to take the Suez Canal. And it now appeared crystal clear that above all else it was necessary to "sink" the airbase that was Malta. Rome and Berlin, therefore, finally began to reconsider the possibilities of conquering Malta. This operation was to be carried out by landings of Italian and German troops both from the sea and the air." Bragadin, page 156〕 Indeed, after a series of Allied setbacks changed the overall scenario, the Italians achieved naval superiority over their enemies by spring 1942.〔"The Alexandria operation, therefore, denoted the effective overcoming of the grave crisis under whose menace the Italian Fleet had lain for two months, and indirectly it delineated a definitive Italian victory in the ′first battle of convoys′. In fact, it opened a period of clear Italian naval supremacy in the east-central Mediterranean." Bragadin, page 152〕〔"With Force K decimated and the battleships ''Valiant'' and ''Queen Elizabeth'' resting on the bottom of Alexandria harbor, the British navy could not contest the Italians in the central Mediterranean basin. An Axis air offensive against Malta and the loss of air bases in Cyrenaica further weakened the British, who were having problems reading the new GAF signals and lost the German army cipher in early 1942. Ultra continued to read C38m through the spring, but if this was unfortunate for Axis convoys, it was less so for the Italian fleet, which used the cipher only after putting to sea. As a result, Axis air and naval forces dominated the central and eastern basins, and Comando Supremo ran convoys to Africa with relative impunity through the early summer."Sadkovich, page 219〕 As Malta was running short of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, fuel, food and ammunition, convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March.〔Woodman, page 293〕〔Thomas, page 143〕 The British expected opposition from German and Italian aircraft as well as Italian surface units. In December 1941, the two battleships ( and ) stationed in the eastern Mediterranean had been disabled by an attack by Italian frogmen, and so their Alexandria squadron consisted only of cruisers and destroyers.〔 Meanwhile, a diversion was organized from Gibraltar: on the morning of 20 March, the battleship —with the aircraft carriers and , supported by the cruiser and eight destroyers—set sail from "The Rock". The next day, the squadron aborted the operation and returned to port – the carriers were unable to fly off aircraft reinforcements to Malta due to defective long-range fuel tanks.〔Woodman, page 295〕 The escort of convoy MW10 relied heavily on destroyers—including lighter-built destroyer escorts—to provide anti-submarine protection and included the anti-aircraft cruiser to bolster the convoy's anti-aircraft capability. Additional destroyers and another light cruiser were also sent from Malta.〔"With Vian's cruisers, Carlisle and the Hunts, the escort was well provided with anti-aircraft firepower as the entire force united on the morning of 21 March." Woodman, page 294〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Second Battle of Sirte」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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